M.C. RAVIKUMAR VERSUS D.S. VELMURUGAN (SUPREME COURT) 2025 INSC 888
COURT: | Supreme Court |
JUDGES: | Sandeep Mehta J, VIKRAM NATH J |
LEGISLATION(S): | Section 482 Cr.P.C. |
COUNSEL: | N. A |
FILE: | Click here to download the file in pdf format |
Section 482 Cr.P.C: There is no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie. It depends upon the facts and circumstances. However, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted |
(i) From the bare perusal of the record, it is evident that the second quashing petition raised no such grounds/pleas which were unavailable to the accused-respondents at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition. The failure of the accused- respondents to raise a pertinent ground/plea which was tangibly available to them at the time of adjudication of the first quashing petition can in no circumstance grant a right to the said accused persons to file a subsequent quashing petition as it would amount to seeking review on pre-existing material.
(ii) The Court in catena of judgments has held that it is not open to an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 though all such pleas were very much available to him even at the first instance.
(iii) There is no sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition. (See Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP & Anr. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399)
(iv) The order passed by the High Court in the second quashing petition amounted to review (plain and simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the High Court in the first quashing petition, since there was admittedly no change in circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became available to the accused-respondents, after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition. The order passed by the High Court is in gross disregard to all tenets of law as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error.
(v) This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. (See Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Anr (1990) 2 SCC 437)